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Forthcoming in Social Psychological and Personality Science 
 
What is the extent and nature of religious prosociality? If religious prosociality exists, is it 
parochial and extended selectively to co-religionists, or is it generalized regardless of the 
recipient? Further, is it driven by preferences to help others or by expectations of reciprocity? 
We examined how much of a $0.30 bonus Mechanical Turk workers would share with the 
other player whose religion was prominently displayed during two online resource allocation 
games. In one game (but not the other), the recipient could choose to reciprocate. Results 
from both games showed that the more central religion was in participants’ lives, the more of 
the bonus they shared, regardless of whether they were giving to atheists or Christians. 
Furthermore, this effect was most clearly related to self-reported frequency of “thinking 
about religious ideas”, rather than belief in God or religious practice/experience. Our findings 
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 Compared to the nonreligious, religious individuals are perceived as being more 
moral (Hout & Fisher, 2002), likable (Bailey & Young, 1986), and trustworthy (Bailey & 
Doriot, 1985). In contrast, atheists experience distrust and prejudice – and particularly so 
from religious people (Gervais, Shariff, & Norenzayan, 2011). But to what extent are such 
stereotypes of atheists as less cooperative grounded in reality? Are religious people really 
more prosocial than atheists?  
 To investigate this, researchers have increasingly utilized behavioral economic games 
as an effective tool to explore prosocial behavior, wherein participants make real monetary 
choices that affect earnings for themselves and others. Behavior in these games has been 
shown to have a reliable relationship to prosocial behavior in everyday life (Peysakhovich et 
al, 2014). For example, giving in a Dictator Game (DG) predicts both giving to charity in a 
field setting (Benz & Meier, 2008) and the returning of money mistakenly mailed to them in 
a misdirected letter (Franzen & Pointner, 2013). But using economic games, the relationship 
between religiosity and prosocial behavior remains unclear (for critical reviews see Galen, 
2012; and Preston, Ritter, & Hernandez, 2010). Some studies find a positive relationship, 
whereby religiosity is associated with prosocial behavior as measured by giving in DGs 
(Eckel & Grossman, 2003; Tan, 2006), Public Goods cooperation (Ahmed, 2009), and 
trustworthiness in a Trust Game (TG) (Tan & Vogel, 2008). Other work, however, has failed 
to find a relationship between religiosity and prosocial behaviour in the DG (Eckel & 
Grossman, 2004; Anderson, Mellor, & Milyo, 2010; Paciotti et al. 2011), the TG (Anderson 
et al. 2010; Bellemare & Kröger, 2007), or Public Goods Dilemmas (Ahmed & Salas, 2009; 
Orbell et al., 1992). Still other studies have suggested that such effects are moderated by the 
(lack of) religious belief of the other player whereby greater prosocial behaviour by religious 
people in a DG is seen only when the recipient shares the religious identity of the participant 
(Ben-Ner, McCall, Stephane, & Wang, 2009).  
 Consideration of the existing literature on religious prosociality, then, reveals mixed 
effects and three competing hypotheses can be discerned. First, a religious prosociality 
equivalence hypothesis predicts that religious and non-religious individuals are equally 
prosocial. Second, a generalized religious prosociality hypothesis predicts that religious 
individuals are more prosocial regardless of the recipient. Third, a religious parochialism 
hypothesis predicts that religious people are only more prosocial towards co-religionists. 
Beyond these hypotheses derived from the body of research on religious prosociality, a fourth 
hypothesis is that atheists are more prosocial overall, and a fifth hypothesis that atheists 
exhibit parochial prosociality.  
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 Here we distinguish between these competing hypotheses by examining the 
relationship between religiosity and prosociality when giving to Christian versus atheist 
partners in economic games. Previous work has often compared prosociality among religious 
individuals vs. individuals that have not specified a religion (e.g. Kibbutz members vs. 
anonymous city members, Ruffle & Sosis, 2006). Yet to explore the extent of religious 
prosociality, atheists are an ideal recipient comparison group because they constitute a clearly 
distinct group from religious individuals (one cannot easily be a Christian and an atheist), and 
moreover one that is particularly disliked across many demographics (Edgell, Gerteis & 
Hartmann, 2006). If religious prosociality is primarily parochial – rather than generalized – 
we would expect prosocial behavior to be extended selectively towards other religious 
individuals and not atheists. On the other hand, if religious prosociality is a generalized 
phenomenon, we would expect religious individuals to be more prosocial even to members of 
such a generally disliked group.  
As a secondary question, we investigated the psychological mechanisms underlying 
religious prosociality - assuming it was observed at all - using the conceptual apparatus of 
social preferences and expectations (for a review see Everett, Faber, & Crockett, 2015). To 
what extent is religious prosociality driven by expectations that others are more likely to 
reciprocate prosocial behaviour, versus a more enhanced valuing of others’ outcomes? If the 
religious prosociality is driven primarily by social preferences whereby religious people 
simply prefer to help others, one would expect to observe religious prosociality even in 
circumstances in which there is no potential for the partner to reciprocate. Conversely, if 
religious prosociality is explained primarily by the belief that being prosocial is personally 
advantageous (cooperating conditionally based on expected reciprocation), this could lead to 
increased self-interested prosociality. To address this question we chose to examine 
prosociality in two different settings: first, in an economic game that primarily measures social 
preferences regarding the outcomes of others (Dictator Game, Forsythe, Horowitz, Savin, & 
Sefton, 1994); and secondly, in a game that primarily involves expectations of reciprocity 
(Trust Game, Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995). In the DG, one player - the dictator – is given 
some money and makes a unilateral decision about how much of this money to share with a 
second (anonymous) player - the recipient - who must accept whatever amount the dictator 
chooses to give. In our DG, any money the dictator gave to the recipient was doubled by the 
experimenter. Behaviour in the DG can be interpreted as resulting from the dictator’s social 
preferences, not expectations about how the recipient will respond, because the recipient does 
not take any action – thus there is no potential for reciprocity. In contrast, behaviour in the TG 
RELIGIOUS PROSOCIALITY  4 
is affected by both preferences and expectations. The TG also has two players, an investor and 
a recipient, and like the DG, the investor is given some money and told that they can send a 
proportion to the recipient, and that the experimenter will double any money sent. Unlike the 
DG, however, once the recipient receives the money, they can choose to send some portion of 
what they have received back to the investor. Therefore, while a self-interested dictator would 
send nothing in the DG, a self-interested investor in the TG might send money depending on 
their expectations about the recipient’s behaviour: if the investor trusts that the recipient will 
return 50% or more of what she receives, the investor pays no cost (or even makes money) 
while helping the recipient.  
Leaving aside disagreements in the literature as to whether - and to whom - religious 
people are more prosocial, different accounts have also been posited to explain why increased 
religious prosociality occurs. One possibility is that religious individuals may be more 
prosocial due to the kinds of beliefs they have about the nature of reality, whereby a sensitivity 
to punishments and rewards from supernatural agents may enforce norms even in the absence 
of human social monitoring (McKay et al., 2011; Atkinson & Bourrat, 2011).  Alternatively, 
religious prosociality may be a by-product of sociological factors, including stronger social 
networks among religious groups (Putnam & Campbell, 2010; Lewis, MacGregor, & Putnam, 
2013). Yet more possibilities are that specific kinds of religious practices inculcate prosocial 
tendencies, such as religious rituals (Xygalatas, 2013) or religious experiences (James, 1902). 
To help shed light on this, we measured multiple components of religiosity (including 
frequency of private prayer, frequency of public worship, and certainty of belief in God) to see, 
if religious prosociality is observed, what elements of religiosity best predict this prosociality. 
Study 1 
Method 
 Participants. 582 American participants (268 female) were recruited online using 
Amazon Mechanical Turk and paid $0.50 for their time, with an option of keeping an 
additional bonus of $0.30. Only participants who passed simple comprehension checks 
concerning the payment structure and rules of the games were included in data analysis. 
Because we had planned on running a TG in a subsequent study, and the TG instructions are 
more complex than those of the DG, we were concerned that there would be systematic 
variation in participants across studies (i.e. participants in the TG would be more 
sophisticated on average than those in the DG). Therefore, after participants made their DG 
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decision, they were shown the instructions for the TG and completed the TG comprehension 
checks.  
 In the main paper, results are reported only for participants who passed 
comprehension checks for both games, took the survey only once, and who identified as 
either Christian or Atheist (N=296); results including all religious participants can be seen in 
the S.I. Of the Christian participants (N=165), nearly all were at least moderately certain that 
God exists (98%); and, with a frequency of at least “occasionally”, 83% reported thinking 
about religious issues, 80% reported praying, 76% reported experiencing God intervening in 
their life, and 55% took part in religious services (see S.I. for further details). Participants 
were politically moderate on average (on a 1-7 scale; M=4.48, SD=1.67). An a priori power 
analysis using G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, & Lang, 2009) revealed that for the a 2x2 design 
and taking Cohen’s f effect size standards of 0.14 as small, and 0.39 as medium, 256 
participants were required to detect a small-to-medium sized interaction effect (f =0.20) with 
an alpha of .05 and power of .80. Therefore, this study was sufficiently powered. 
 Design. Participants were informed at the start of the study that they would be playing 
a simple game with another participant. To manipulate the religious identity of the recipient 
(Person B; the second player), participants were given four pieces of information about the 
other player. All participants were explicitly reminded that the other player would not know 
any information about themselves or their (lack of) religious affiliation. The other player was 
described as living in the United States, speaking English as their primary language, and 
being over the age of 18. The fourth piece of information constituted the experimental 
manipulation, where participants were told that the player identified as Christian or as an 
atheist. This information was presented in both text form and with a symbol presented on 
both the pre-decision page and the decision page, and it was made salient to participants that 
there was no deception in this task and that the decisions they made were real. Participants 
answered questions on their own religiosity after making their decisions in the economic 
game to avoid potential religious priming effects. 
  Participants were given the following instructions:  
In this interaction you are matched with a real other person. One of you will be 
Person A, one of you will be Person B. Person A starts with a 30 cent bonus, 
and Person B starts a 0 cent bonus. Person A makes a choice. Person A can 
choose how much of their 30 cents to transfer to Person B. Whatever person A 
transfers is doubled and given to person B. 
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 Participants indicated how many cents they wanted to transfer in 5-cent increments. 
We doubled the money transferred in our DG in order to make the game equivalent to the 
Trust Game, described below in Study 2, with the important exception that in the DG the 
recipient is powerless and takes no action. 
   
Measures.  
Centrality of Religion was measured using Huber and Huber’s (2012) short item 
Centrality of Religiosity Scale (CRS). The CRS is a measure of the centrality, importance, 
and salience of religiousness in a person, and consisted of five items each tapping one of the 
theoretically defined core dimensions of religiosity: public practice, private practice, religious 
experience, ideology and intellectual. Participants were asked to rate on a 5-item scale “How 
often do you think about religious issues?” (Intellect: 1=never; 5=very often); “To what 
extent do you believe that God or something divine exists?” (Ideology: 1=not at all, 5=very 
much so); “How often do you take part in religious services?” (Public practice: 1=never, 
5=very often); “How often do you pray?” (Private practice: 1=never, 5=very often); and 
“How often do you experience situations in which you have the feeling that God or 
something divine intervenes in your life?” (Experience: 1=never, 5=very often). Scores were 
combined into a single reliable measure (α=.91) of the centrality of religiousness for each 
participant. 
Negative Attitudes Towards Atheists (NATA) were measured using 7 items adapted 
from Gervais (2011). Participants rated their agreement with a number of statements on a 1-7 
scale (1=not at all, 7=very much), including “I would prefer to spend time with people who 
are religious believers” (α=.92). 
 
Results 
We first looked at whether there were main effects of participant identification as 
Christian or atheist on the amount of money transferred (indicating religious prosociality), 
and if there was an interaction between religiousness and whether the recipient was atheist or 
Christian (indicating that such prosociality was parochial vs. generalized). Christian 
participants transferred more in the DG, F(1,292)=12.39, p<.001, and while there was a 
significant interaction, F(1,292)=6.28, p=.01, simple effects showed that only atheist 
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participants, t(128.411)=2.19, p=.03, but not Christian participants t(163)=-1.58, p=.12, 
transferred significantly different amounts based on the recipient’s religiosity (see Figure 1a). 
Given the sample size of 165, the current analysis had an 80% statistical power to detect a 
small-to-medium sized effect (f=0.20) at α=0.05, two-tailed. Thus if there had been a large 
effect of recipient religion on Christian participants’ behavior in the dictator game, we would 
likely have been able to reject the null hypothesis.  
We complemented these analyses with a regression-based approach using a 
continuous measure of participant religiosity (CRS from 1 to 5, centered), as well as recipient 
religiosity (categorical manipulated variable; atheist (-1) or Christian (+1)), and the 
interaction between the two (see S.I. for further details). There was a significant main effect 
of participant religiosity, B=1.73, t(293)=4.94, p<.001, whereby religiosity was associated 
with increased transfer amounts (see Figure 1b) and no significant main effect of recipient’s 
religiosity, B=0.02, t(293)=0.05, p=.96. The interaction between participant religiosity and 
recipient religiosity did not reach statistical significance, B=0.67, t(292)=1.89 , p=.06, and 
simple effects showed no significant effect of recipient religiosity for either more or less 
religious participants. These effects were robust to controlling for gender, ethnicity, 
education, and political ideology; looking only at differences within Christians and not 
atheists; and held when using participants from all religious affiliations (see S.I. for statistics) 
– in all three cases, the marginally significant interaction between participant religiosity and 
recipient religiosity became fully non-significant. Thus, we found no convincing evidence of 
any religious-specific parochialism, though the data suggest that there might be some weak 
form of ingroup-favouring parochialism on the part of both atheist and religious participants. 
Individuals with stronger religious beliefs were significantly more generally prosocial; our 
evidence does not support the religious parochialism hypothesis. 
 
 
                                                
1 Assuming equal variance resulted in the same p value of p= .03 
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Figure 1a. Self-identifying Christian participants transferred more than atheist 
participants towards both Christian and atheist recipients in a Dictator Game. Error bars 
represent 95% C.I.s 
 
 
Figure 1b. Transfers in cents in the Dictator Game in Study 1 as a function of recipient and 
participant religiosity (binned to the nearest integer with the mean displayed across all 
observations in that bin). The size of the dots is proportional to the number of observations. 
 
We next conducted these analyses using each individual component of the CRS to test 
whether these effects were explained by one particular component of religiosity. While there 
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follow-up mediation analyses indicated that how often participants thought about religious 
issues fully mediated the relationship between DG transfers and all four other components of 
the CRS (extent of belief in God, frequency of religious practices or experiences) (see S. I. 
for statistics). Furthermore, a multiple regression analysis including each CRS component 
together showed that the frequency with which participants reported thinking about religious 
issues was the only significant predictor (B=1.78, t(289)=3.69, p<.001). Thus, the extent to 
which participants believed that God exists, and the frequency of religious experiences, 
prayer and attending religious services did not appear to influence their level of prosociality, 
except in so much as they acted as proxies for frequency of thinking about religious issues. 
Furthermore, we note that when replicating our main analysis using frequency of thinking 
about religious issues rather than the full CRS measure, there is even less evidence of an 
interaction between participant religiosity and recipient religiosity, B=0.47, t(293)=1.25, 
p=.21. 
 Finally, to ensure that these results were not driven by our sample being unusually 
unprejudiced towards atheists, we explored whether self-reported negative attitudes towards 
atheists translated into actual discrimination. We found a significant positive main effect of 
NATA on giving, B=0.92, t(293)=3.41, p<.001, but no significant main effect of recipient 
religiosity, B=0.04, t(293)=0.09, p=.93, and no interaction between the two, B=0.32, 
t(292)=1.17, p=.24, whereby self-reported anti-atheist prejudice actually led to increased 
giving to atheists, and did so just as much as to religious recipients. This relationship between 
NATA and transfer amounts was fully mediated by CRS, with the 95% bias-corrected 





 600 participants (282 female) were recruited again through MTurk in the same 
between-subjects design as in Study 1. The instructions and response format for the TG were 
designed to be as similar to the DG as possible, where, participants chose how much of an 
initial $0.30 endowment they would like to transfer to a second participant who was either 
atheist or religious. The crucial difference was that in the TG participants were told “Person 
B can then choose how much of the money they want to transfer back to Person A”. 
Participants indicated how much they would like to transfer in 5-cent increments, and after 
RELIGIOUS PROSOCIALITY  10 
the transfer were asked to indicate on the next page the percentage of the money they 
expected the second player to transfer back to them (0%, 25%, 50%, 75%, 100%). Predicted 
returns were measured to complement the main measure of transfer amounts in the TG as a 
more explicit measure of trust in the recipient. 
In order to eliminate deception and to determine the bonuses paid to participants, we 
looked at the decisions of two individuals who played as the second mover in a TG in an 
earlier unrelated study; identified either as a Christian or Atheist; and matched the 
demographic information told to participants. These two second movers were then matched 
with all participants from the current study, and paid accordingly for each matching. As the 
instructions did not indicate that second movers played only one game, this multiple 
matching procedure is not inconsistent with the instructions and therefore does not constitute 
deception. 
 As in Study 1, results are reported only for participants who passed comprehension 
checks for both games, took the survey only once, and who identified as either Christian or 
Atheist (N=272), but results using all religious participants can be seen in the S.I. Of the 
Christian participants (N=140), nearly all were at least moderately certain that God exists 
(97%); and with a frequency of at least “occasionally”, 83% reported thinking about religious 
issues, 79% reported praying, 79% reported experiencing God intervening in their life, and 
62% took part in religious services. As in Study 1, Christian participants were more religious 
than those from other religions (see S.I.). Participants were politically moderate on average 
(M=4.67, SD=1.72).  Using the same power analysis as in Study 1, this study was sufficiently 
powered. 
Results  
Transfer Amounts. Using the binary identification measure, and contrary to the 
results in the DG, Christian participants did not transfer more in the TG, F(1,268)=2.01, 
p=.16, there was no effect of recipient’s religiosity F(1,268) = 0.25, p = .62,, and there was 
no interaction with recipient religious belief, F(1,268)=0.35, p=.56 (see Figure 2a). However, 
when using a regression-based approach with the continuous measure of religiosity, there was 
a significant main effect of participant religiosity, B=1.46, t(269)=2.62, p=.009, whereby 
religiosity was associated with increased transfer amounts (see Figure 2b) and as with the 
binary measure, no significant main effect of recipient’s religiosity, B=-0.43, t(269)=-0.61, 
p=.55 or interaction B=0.39, t(268)=0.70, p=.48). This effect using the continuous measure of 
religiosity was robust to controlling for gender, ethnicity, education, and political ideology; 
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looking only at differences within Christians and not atheists; and held when using 
participants from all religious affiliations (see S.I. for statistics). It remains to be seen why 
identification as a Christian was not a significant predictor of transfer amounts, but crucially, 
the continuous measure was – including when looking at religious differences only within 
self-identifying Christians. 
 
Figure 2a. Self-identifying Christian participants transferred more than atheist 
participants towards both Christian and atheist recipients in a Trust Game. Error bars 
represent 95% C.I.s. 
 
 
Figure 2b. Transfers in cents in the Trust Game in Study 2 as a function of recipient and 
participant religiosity (binned to the nearest integer with the mean displayed across all 






















































We next conducted these analyses using each individual component of the CRS to test 
whether these effects were explained by one particular component of religiosity. As in Study 
1, there were again significant main effects of all five components when analyzed separately, 
but frequency of thinking about religious issues fully mediated the effect of all other CRS 
components, and was the only a significant term B=1.91, t(265)=2.45, p=.01 in a multiple 
regression including each of the five components.  
In contrast to Study 1, we found no main effect of NATA on giving, B=0.72, 
t(269)=1.62, p=.11, no significant main effect of recipient religiosity, B=-0.45, t(269)=-0.63, 
p=.53, and no interaction between the two, B=0.32, t(268)=0.70, p=.48.   
 
Predicted Return. We next used the same analyses to explore effects of participant 
and recipient religiosity on participants’ expectations regarding how much their partner 
would return to them in the TG. Christian participants predicted greater returns, F(1,268) = 
4.65, p = .03, and there was no interaction effect F(1,268) = 1.43, p = .23. In other words, 
Christian participants did not selectively trust other Christians by predicting them to return 
more than atheists. Given the sample size of 139, the current analysis had an 80% statistical 
power to detect a small-to-medium sized effect (f = 0.24) at α=0.05, two-tailed. Thus if there 
had been a large effect of recipient religion on Christian participants' behavior on predicted 
returns, we would likely have been able to reject the null hypothesis.  Recall that the primary 
purpose of including the measure of predicted returns was to complement the dependent 
measure of transfer amounts to explore whether, if religious parochialism was observed in the 
TG, this could be attributed to greater trust of Christians over atheists. Because Christians 
were more prosocial in both the DG and the TG and showed no parochialism, we do not 
report further analyses on predicted returns, though these can be seen in the S.I. 
 
General Discussion 
What is the extent and nature of religious prosociality? While some experimental 
research has suggested that religious individuals are more prosocial in general with regards to 
resource distribution (e.g. Ahmed, 2009), other work has suggested that religious people are 
only selectively prosocial towards co-religionists (e.g. Ruffle & Sosis, 2006), or even that 
they are not more prosocial at all (e.g. Eckel & Grossman, 2004). And if religious people are 
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more prosocial, is this driven only by religious individuals’ greater expectations of 
cooperation from others? 
We found evidence consistent with the claim that religious prosociality is a 
generalized phenomenon based on prosocial preferences: Christian participants transferred 
more money to both Christian and atheist recipients in both the DG and TG. Therefore, we 
found evidence for generalized religious prosociality and against religious parochialism: 
Christian religious participants were more prosocial than atheists, towards both religious and 
atheist recipients. This pattern was, however, explained entirely by how often people thought 
about religious issues. Such results provide clear behavioral evidence supporting conclusions 
from correlational and self-reported sociological data on the positive relationship between 
religiosity and both formal and informal prosocial behaviours (e.g. Monsma, 2007; Putnam & 
Campbell, 2010), while also suggesting that religious prosociality effects cannot be explained 
entirely as a result of social networks (e.g. Lewis et al, 2013; Putnam & Campbell, 2010), 
accountability arising from belief in an all-knowing God who punishes bad actions and 
rewards good actions (e.g. Atkinson & Bourrat, 2011; McKay et al., 2011), or the specific 
nature of religious rituals or experiences (e.g. James, 1902; Xygalatas, 2013). But why might 
the frequency of thinking about religious issues be so predictive of prosociality, rather than 
the extent of belief in God, or frequency of religious practices or experiences?  “Thinking 
about religious issues” is a broad category, and likely includes representing many aspects of 
religious life and traditions. One possibility is that increased frequency in thinking about 
religious issues may represent a more general existential orientation to one’s life as a whole 
and its nature, purpose, and meaning, while another (not mutually exclusive) possibility could 
be that thinking about religious issues represents reflection on moral norms within religious 
traditions that decree how to live. Further investigation is necessary to better characterize 
what this category entails, and the extent to which it could also be a part of non-religious 
institutions that inculcate strong moral contemplation (e.g. de Botton, 2012), and help to 
build habits of virtue (e.g. Peysakhovich & Rand, 2015), or whether its content is specific to 
religious traditions that incorporate beliefs, practices, and experiences oriented around 
supernatural and transcendent ideas.  
Because Christians treated the TG and DG identically even though each game 
represents a different incentive structure, this evidence suggests that religious prosociality is 
driven by social preferences about moral behaviour rather than by strategic expectations 
about how others will respond.  This ties together with prior evidence that religious 
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individuals rely more heavily on their intuitions (Shenhav, Rand, & Greene, 2012), and that 
intuitive processing tends to support cooperation in economics games (Rand, Greene, & 
Nowak, 2012; Rand et al. 2014), even when interacting with out-group members (Rand, 
Newman, & Wurzbacher, 2014). It would be fruitful for future research to explore further the 
connection between religiosity and intuitive cooperation. 
A potentially interesting and unexpected finding was that in the DG, Christians who 
explicitly reported more negative attitudes towards atheists actually still acted more 
prosocially towards atheists. Although mediation analysis indicated that this effect was 
explained by religiosity, rather than negative attitudes against atheists per se, it remains an 
interesting example of an intergroup context where explicit negative attitudes do not 
correspond with behavioral discrimination, suggesting that future work on anti-atheist and 
other forms of prejudice should take care to include behavioral manifestations of prejudice 
rather than reports of attitudes alone.  
Certain limitations of the present work bear mention. First, it was salient in our design 
that the recipient was either a self-identifying atheist or Christian. As with most economic 
game experiments, there is always a concern about demand characteristics. Specifically, the 
saliency of the recipient’s belief may have introduced demand characteristics which could 
have affected results. Nonetheless, even if participants did guess that the study was about 
religion, and only Christians – but not atheists – were motivated to present their group in a 
positive light, this would be interesting in itself because atheist participants are the ones for 
whom acting prosocially would help improve their group’s image and so may be especially 
motivated to respond to the demand characteristics in question. A second consideration is that 
while the Christian participants in our sample were moderately religious, it remains to be 
seen whether these results would be observed amongst participants who are very highly 
religious and enmeshed in their religious communities. It would be useful, therefore, for 
future work to explore the extent of religious prosociality in less artificial contexts and with 
more participants who are extremely high on religiosity. 
We end by noting that we welcome future replications of these studies. We do not 
know under what conditions the present findings are highly likely to replicate; but believe 
that the present findings will replicate – at a minimum – when using a) online studies with 
mainly b) Christian religious participants, c) relatively low payoff stakes and where d) the 
religious identity of the recipient is highly salient.  
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